

response that if contact were established, the UAR must make the first move and there could be no contact until the UAR executed the Bunker agreement and disengaged from Yemen. (Telegram 132 from Jidda, August 2; *ibid.*) On August 9, the UAR accepted the proposal for quiet talks with Saudi officials provided that the United States and not Lebanon played the third-party role. (Telegram 345 from Cairo; *ibid.*, POL 27 SAUD-UAR)

300. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy

Washington, July 23, 1963.

The 4:30 Tuesday meeting is to consider next steps on UAR-Israeli missile/nuclear limitations, and the intimately related question of Israeli security guarantee. McCloy and Badeau will attend.

Our original idea was to get Nasser tentatively signed on to nuclear missile scheme and then use this as the quid pro quo to sign up Israel. Nasser balked on political grounds, but did talk about an exchange of letters with you. Before going to Israelis, therefore, we ought to see what we can get out of Nasser along these lines.

Even if Nasser comes through, Israel will still try to exact a price for nuclear self-denial and for agreeing to lie low if Jordan collapses. We haven't yet responded to BC's 12 May letter requesting security guarantee, and Israelis are getting itchy. If we now send McCloy to ask them to give up nuclear option, they'll immediately ask "what's in it for us." Dimona inspection is obviously being held up for just this reason.

So there's no point in sending McCloy to Israel until we've thought through guarantee problem. *Our dilemma is that the more we talk about*

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, UAR/Israel Arms Limitation, 07/11/63-07/31/63. Secret; Cane. Attached to the source text is another copy of this memorandum bearing a marginal note in Komer's hand: "Mac—State couldn't clear its paper in time (it was poor job), so I've sent this in. JFK needs something." Also attached to the source text is a note by Komer entitled "Issues for 4:30 meeting," which reads: "1. What is the next step with Nasser? 2. Timing and nature of McCloy probe in Israel, if any? 3. How far should we go down guarantee road in order to get nuclear self-denial from Israel? 4. What reply, even interim, to Israeli request for security guarantee? I doubt that any of these can be finally decided today, but it is essential we get some forward motion."